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LITIGATING IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS:
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN
FEDERAL COURT
51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Jeffrey S. Sutton.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press. 2018. Pp. xi + 278. $29.95 (Hardcover).
Michael T. Morley1
INTRODUCTION
It is somewhat ironic that a sitting federal judge, Jeffrey S.
Sutton, would write a book challenging the standard model of
American constitutional law, which presents life-tenured federal
judges enforcing the U.S. Constitution as the primary defenders
of individual liberty against racist states, craven elected officials,
overzealous police, and heartless bureaucrats.2 In 51 Imperfect
Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law,
Sutton contends that state courts, constitutions, and even
legislatures have played—and should continue to play—critical
roles in promoting individual liberty (p. 2). In particular, Sutton

* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Special
thanks to Barbara Atwood, Michael Collins, Andrew Hessick, Jack Landau, Caprice
Roberts, and Alan Trammell for their comments, suggestions, and feedback. I am also
grateful to Brian Bix for his editorial assistance throughout this process, as well as
Margaret Clark, Dylan Dunn, and Felicia Warren for their invaluable help in revising this
piece.
2. See Owen Fiss, Law Is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 257, 270 (2007); Burt
Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555,
555 (2005). Consistent with this traditional view, Sutton acknowledges that the “U.S.
Supreme Court recognized many of the rights it did between the 1940s and 1960s because
many state courts (and state legislatures and state governors) resisted protecting individual
rights, most notably in the South but hardly there alone” (p. 14).
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joins the chorus of federal3 and state judges,4 as well as scholars,5
who argue that state constitutions, interpreted and enforced by
state judges, are an important source of potentially greater
protection for many rights than the U.S. Constitution (pp. 1–2).
Sutton contends that we “see American lawyers regularly
taking just one shot rather than two to invalidate state or local
laws,” by failing to raise or sufficiently brief arguments under
state constitutions (p. 7). He reiterates this point throughout the
book (pp. 8, 10, 15). It is difficult to gauge the empirical validity
of Sutton’s claim that state constitutional rights are presently
neglected by litigants and underenforced by courts. Although this
was certainly the case in decades past, it is unclear whether state
constitutions remain unnoticed and ignored; by the 1990s,
commentators were acknowledging the depth of attention state

3. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977); Diane Sykes, The “New Federalism”:
Confessions of a Former State Supreme Court Justice, 38 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 367, 392–
93 (2013); see also Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 641 (2016) (Scalia J., for the Court) (“The
state courts may experiment all they want with their own constitutions, and often do so in
the wake of this Court’s decisions.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454–55 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (endorsing “the emerging trend among high state courts of relying
upon state constitutional protections of individual liberties”); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973) (Marshall J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the
Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding schemes
under state constitutional provisions.”).
4. See, e.g., [Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice] Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We
Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 724
(1991); [California Supreme Court Justice] Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State
Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 396–97 (1988); [Oregon Supreme Court
Justice] Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT.
L. REV. 379, 383 (1980); [New Jersey Supreme Court Justice] Stewart G. Pollock, State
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 707, 717
(1983); [Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice] Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature
of State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 440 (1996); cf.
[Massachusetts Appeals Court Justice] Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do
It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of Massachusetts’ Declaration
of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 342–43 (2007); see also Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The
Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 211 n.4
(2003) (citing articles by state court judges about the importance of relying on state
constitutions to protect individual rights).
5. See Williams, supra note 4, at 211 (explaining that theorizing about the distinct
role that state constitutions play in protecting individual rights “cannot be described as
‘new’ anymore”); see, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and
the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 98–99 (2000); Jennifer Friesen,
State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1073–74 (1997); Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State
Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2011).
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constitutions had received.6
Sutton specifically points out the lack of state constitutional
claims in federal court. He explains that, throughout his fifteenyear tenure as a Sixth Circuit judge, he saw “many constitutional
challenges to state or local laws,” yet can “recall just one instance
in which the claimant meaningfully challenged the validity of a
law on federal and state constitutional grounds” (p. 8). Attorneys’
ignorance of state constitutions or overreliance on federal
protections may not be the main cause of Sutton’s experience,
however. Rather, federal jurisdictional and procedural
restrictions pose substantial obstacles—obstacles that Sutton
largely does not acknowledge—to the adjudication of state
constitutional claims in federal court. Since 51 Imperfect Solutions
is aimed at least partly at a general audience, one would not
expect it to offer a detailed discussion of the nuances of federal
jurisdiction and procedure. This Review explores the major
doctrines that hinder plaintiffs from pursuing state constitutional
claims in federal court and suggests some initial reforms.7
Part I begins by summarizing Sutton’s analysis of the role of
state constitutions, courts, and legislatures in protecting
individual liberty. This Part discusses the various ways in which
Sutton contends that state constitutional law and federal
constitutional law may interact with each other, briefly sketching
the case studies he uses to illustrate each possible type of
6. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional
Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 841 (1991) (“Among the most noteworthy
developments in constitutional law during the past two decades has been the renewed
reliance by state courts on state constitutions as independent sources of rights. . . . The
willingness to look at state constitutions is no longer confined to a few adventuresome
courts . . . .”); see also Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1997) (“The question of whether, and
under what circumstances, it is legitimate for state courts to reach conclusions under their
state constitutions that are more protective of rights than United States Supreme Court
decisions is one of the most important questions of American constitutional federalism.”).
7. I am grateful to Professor Andrew Hessick for pointing out that one major reason
why federal courts do not adjudicate state constitutional claims more frequently is that the
federal habeas statute allows a state criminal defendant to collaterally attack his or her
conviction only on the grounds that it violates the U.S. Constitution (or a federal law or
treaty), rather than state constitutions, as well. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018); e.g., Wills v.
Engler, 532 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976); Velez v. Martinez, 510 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir.
1975). The scope of federal habeas review is primarily within Congress’ control, however.
This Review focuses on judicially created doctrines that may deter litigants from pursuing
state constitutional claims in federal court or preclude federal courts from adjudicating
them.

MORLEY 35:2

404

12/29/2020 11:21 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:401

relationship.
Part II explains how abstention doctrine under Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman often precludes federal courts
from adjudicating state constitutional claims,8 but in inconsistent
ways that fail to fully respect the independence of federal and
state constitutional provisions. Challenging current doctrine, this
Part recommends that federal courts should apply a single
uniform standard when deciding whether to apply Pullman
abstention due to a state constitutional provision, rather than
basing abstention decisions on whether that provision has an
analogue in the U.S. Constitution, or is worded broadly or
narrowly. It further suggests that a federal court should not
consider Pullman abstention in a federal constitutional challenge
to a state or local legal provision based on potential state
constitutional infirmities unless the federal suit actually includes
a claim under the state constitution. This Part also contends that
federal courts should ensure that their judgments concerning state
constitutional issues do not prevent other rightholders from
relitigating them in state court. Thus, federal courts should
neither certify statewide classes nor grant statewide defendantoriented injunctions in cases involving state constitutional claims.
Part III demonstrates that Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity is another obstacle to federal adjudication of state
constitutional claims. The Pennhurst Doctrine protects states,
state agencies, and state officials from being sued in federal court
for alleged violations of state law, including the state constitution.9
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should mitigate the
effects of the Pennhurst Doctrine by creating an exception to res
judicata principles. When the doctrine forces litigants to split their
federal and state constitutional claims between federal and state
courts, the state court judgment should not give rise to a res
judicata effect in federal court.10
Part IV explains that, even when district courts are permitted
to adjudicate state constitutional claims, they frequently decline
to do so by exercising their discretion under the supplemental
jurisdiction statute.11 Rather than establishing a purely
discretionary or completely independent standard for refusing to
8.
9.
10.
11.

R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
Cf. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417–19 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).

3 MORLEY

2020]

12/29/2020 11:21 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

405

hear state law claims, the supplemental jurisdiction statute should
be read consistently with Pullman. A federal court should apply
the same standard to decide whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent state law claims as it would to decide
whether to abstain from adjudicating a state law issue in a case
involving a federal constitutional claim. Part V concludes.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
51 Imperfect Solutions consists primarily of case studies
illustrating the various ways in which federal and state
constitutional law interact with each other. Sutton argues that
state constitutions—as well as state courts, legislatures, and
executive officials—have often provided greater protection for
individual rights than the U.S. Constitution. This most obviously
occurs when a state constitution contains provisions that either
lack analogues in the U.S. Constitution or are phrased more
broadly than their federal counterparts (pp. 33, 35). Many state
constitutions, for example, expressly protect the right to privacy12
and contain requirements or guarantees relating to public
education.13 In contrast, Sutton explains that, in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to recognize education as a fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution.14 Rejecting wealth as a suspect classification for
Equal Protection purposes, the Rodriguez Court also upheld the
constitutionality of disparities in per-pupil spending among states’
public school districts.15 In the years following that ruling,
however, numerous state supreme courts construed provisions of
their respective state constitutions that require states to establish
public school systems16 to mandate some degree of equalized
12. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.
13. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14;
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973).
15. Id. at 28–29, 54–55.
16. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall make such
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund,
will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state. . . .”);
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of
an efficient system of public free schools. . . .”).
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spending among school districts (pp. 30–32, 35).17
A state supreme court also may provide additional
protections for individual liberty by interpreting and applying a
state constitution’s language differently than federal courts have
construed similar or identical provisions in the federal charter
(p. 16).18 Sutton describes how, in Wolf v. Colorado, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches—but not the exclusionary rule—was
incorporated against state governments.19 This ruling allowed
state law enforcement officials to use evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment in state prosecutions. Nearly half the
states went on to reject Wolf by adopting their own state-specific
exclusionary rules, either through the legislature’s enactment of
statutory restrictions or the state supreme court’s interpretation
of the state constitution’s analogue to the Fourth Amendment
(pp. 58–59).
Likewise, a few decades later, when the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the “good faith” exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon,20 many
state supreme courts declined to follow suit, refusing to create
such an exception under their state constitutions (p. 67). Sutton
also points out that, in the three years between the Supreme
17. Sutton points out, “[t]he fortunes of school-funding advocates markedly
improved when they shifted their theories of the case from the negative equal-protectionlike clauses of the state constitutions to the positive school-funding clauses of the state
constitutions” (p. 35). For a more detailed discussion of the use of state constitutional
provisions to reform public school funding systems, see Robert M. Jensen, Advancing
Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2
(1997).
18. The California Constitution expressly disclaims any reliance on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of U.S. Constitution, stating: “Rights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. Under this provision, “even when the terms of the California
Constitution are textually identical to those of the federal Constitution, the proper
interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not invariably identical to the federal
courts’ interpretation of the corresponding provision contained in the federal
Constitution.” Am. Acad. of Pediatricians v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997).
Proposition 115 added the qualification that the state constitution “shall not be construed
by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (1990). The California
Supreme Court held that this provision was invalid because it was “so far reaching as to
amount to a constitutional revision beyond the scope of the initiative process.” Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086 (Cal. 1990).
19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–29, 31 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 644–45, 651 (1961).
20. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
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Court’s ruling in Gobitis v. Minersville School District that public
school students may be compelled to salute the American flag21
and the Court’s repudiation of that conclusion in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,22 a few state supreme courts
construed their state constitutions differently, protecting students
from such coerced expression (pp. 160, 170).
Sutton explains that state constitutional rulings also affect
federal constitutional law, both by providing a model that may
influence the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of comparable
language in the U.S. Constitution, as well as by demonstrating the
benefits and drawbacks of various possible constructions (pp. 20,
82, 212). He declares, for example, “[t]he development of the
exclusionary rule followed (and continues to follow) a Hegelian
path, as the state and federal courts respond to strengths and
weaknesses of their own decisions and to those of other
sovereigns” (p. 67). As mentioned above, the Supreme Court had
initially declined in Wolf v. Colorado to apply the exclusionary
rule to searches by state and local officials that violated the Fourth
Amendment.23 One of the main factors that ultimately led the
Court to overturn Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio24 was the fact that many
state supreme courts had adopted the exclusionary rule under
their respective state constitutions (p. 61). Those rulings allowed
the Court to assess states’ practical experience with extending the
rule to state and local police (p. 69). Moreover, Sutton suggests
that the state courts’ rulings enhanced Mapp’s legitimacy by
contributing to a perception that the Court was responding to
“shifting norms,” rather than its own subjective preferences (pp.
69–70).
Beyond emphasizing the importance of state constitutions in
the protection of individual rights, Sutton also seeks to
rehabilitate the frequent image of state legislators and executive
officials as the villains of American constitutional law. He offers
a counternarrative to the standard model, arguing that such actors
have sometimes been more effective than federal courts in
protecting individual rights (pp. 2, 6). When the U.S. Supreme
Court refuses to recognize rights under the federal Constitution,
21. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
23. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27–29, 31.
24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45, 651.
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Sutton claims, state officials sometimes step in to fill the gap as a
matter of policy.
Following Wolf, for example, some state legislatures enacted
statutes applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutional
seizures by state and local police (p. 59). And after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell upholding Virginia’s involuntary
sterilization law,25 it was state legislatures, rather than federal or
state courts, that ultimately eliminated or greatly narrowed most
statutes of that nature (pp. 124–127). Sutton contends, “[t]he state
legislatures became the eventual heroes of their own story”
(p. 125)—though of course it was state legislatures that had
enacted compulsory sterilization laws in the first place. Even
while sterilization laws remained on the books, Sutton maintains,
state executive officials were often reluctant to implement them,
providing an additional layer of protection for reproductive
freedom (pp. 91–92, 119, 125–126).
These case studies lead Sutton to conclude, similarly to
Alexander Bickel,26 that federal courts should sometimes refrain
from adjudicating important constitutional issues (p. 5)—though
he does not provide concrete guidance on how they should make
that decision. “Maximizing liberty,” Sutton asserts, “does not
invariably follow from a national rule” (p. 77). As a corollary, he
adds, “[i]n a democracy, there is something to be said for allowing
the gravitational forces of representative government to cure
problems of its own making” (pp. 127, 215–216).
Sutton further cautions that, when the Supreme Court
recognizes a right, it often applies what he calls a “federalism
discount”: defining the right narrowly since it will apply in a wide
range of circumstances across the entire nation (p. 17).27 He states,
“[o]ne potential price of . . . a nationwide rule on any
constitutional right . . . may be a nationwide ebbing of the
underlying standard, if not cutbacks on other constitutional rights
and principles” (p. 75). This argument is a variation of Daryl
Levinson’s “remedial equilibration” theory, which teaches that
25. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
26. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 131–33 (2d ed. 1986).
27. See also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 389–90, 396 (1984)
(explaining that state supreme courts need not take into account the same “federalism
concerns” when construing their state constitutions at the U.S. Supreme Court must
consider when interpreting the federal Constitution).
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the practical consequences of recognizing a right often influence
the Court’s definition of that right.28 A state court may have
greater flexibility than the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting
its constitution, Sutton contends, because its rulings apply only to
a single state and can be tailored to that state’s particular
circumstances, culture, and needs, to which its judges are attuned
(pp. 16, 36).29
For example, Sutton suggests that the Supreme Court has
been quick to recognize exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such
as Leon’s good faith exception, as a way of limiting the rule’s
impact on the criminal justice system because Mapp v. Ohio
extended it to state and local police (pp. 71–73). Sutton speculates
that, had the rule remained limited solely to federal law
enforcement officials, as it had been under Wolf, the Court might
have been willing to define it more robustly, subject to far fewer
exceptions (p. 71). He likewise attributes the Court’s refusal in
Linkletter v. Walker30 to apply the rule retroactively to its desire
to contain Mapp’s consequences (p. 74).
Moreover, a Supreme Court ruling affirmatively refusing to
recognize a right may lead state courts to construe their state
constitutions similarly, reducing those charters’ potential as
alternate sources of individual liberties. Sutton points out that,
prior to Buck v. Bell, many state courts had invalidated coercive
sterilization measures on federal or state constitutional grounds
(pp. 92, 107). “Unlike the state courts’ nearly uniform resistance
to eugenics legislation before Buck,” however, “most of the state
courts fell in line after Buck, even when it came to their
independent, uniquely sovereign, and final authority to construe
their own constitutions” (p. 118; see also pp. 125, 131). Sutton
argues that the Court’s “clanging endorsement of eugenics policy”
even caused legislative repeal of such laws to come about “more
slowly” (p. 126).

28. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 889–90 (1999) (discussing remedial deterrence).
29. Cf. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993) (arguing that it is likely “an anachronism or romantic
myth” to assume that each state is a unique political community). Sutton further suggests
that state supreme courts are often better situated than a federal court to force legislatures
to raise taxes (p. 38). And, if a state supreme court’s interpretation of a state constitution
proves erroneous or unworkable, it is more readily correctable than a U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, whether through subsequent cases or constitutional amendment (pp. 18, 36).
30. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1965).
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This reasoning leads Sutton to suggest that public school
students in indigent school districts may have been better off in
the long run as a result of losing Rodriguez (p. 35). Had the
Supreme Court established a federal right to an education, or to
equal funding for education, Sutton contends, it likely would have
applied a federalism discount, defining the scope of that right
much more narrowly than state courts have construed their state
constitutions (pp. 36–37). And state supreme courts may have
been tempted to adopt that same narrow baseline in interpreting
those state constitutions. Thus, Sutton hypothesizes, the U.S.
Supreme Court can sometimes best protect liberty by refraining
from even considering the merits of an issue, leaving it instead to
state officials and state constitutions—a surprising reversal of the
traditional narrative of American constitutional law.
II. ABSTENTION AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Sutton explains that, despite the importance of state
constitutions in protecting individual rights, he has heard only a
single state constitutional claim over the course of his entire
career as a federal judge (p. 8). A major reason why litigants might
refrain from pursuing state constitutional claims in federal court
is because, in the modern era, the U.S. Supreme Court often
requires federal courts to abstain from adjudicating them. Current
abstention doctrine is internally inconsistent, however, and not
well-tailored to protecting the prerogative of state courts to
interpret their respective state constitutions.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in
the era prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,31 state supreme
courts did not always have the last word on the meaning of their
state constitutions. At the time, the Supreme Court construed the
Rules of Decision Act32 as requiring federal courts sitting in
diversity to generally apply state constitutions and statutes, as well
as state court rulings interpreting them.33 Federal courts in
diversity cases were also required to follow state courts’ rulings
on issues of local law, such as property rights.34
31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2018).
33. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).
34. See id. (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity was generally required to
follow state court rulings concerning “rights and titles to things having a permanent
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“[Q]uestions of a more general nature,” in contrast—
particularly commercial matters—were governed by general law
rather than state common law.35 General law was viewed not as
the law of a particular sovereign or jurisdiction, such as the federal
government or a state, but rather a set of universally applicable
principles.36 Whereas states were required to follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal law, they were not
similarly bound regarding its view of general law. Thus, federal
and state courts within a jurisdiction could apply different bodies
of law to the same case, with a federal court invoking an ostensibly
nationally uniform body of general law, and a state court relying
upon its own common law.37
Over time, the domain of general law spread, extending
beyond commercial transactions to embrace questions of
“negligence, punitive damages, and property rights.”38 When a
state statute or even state constitutional provision touched on an
area that fell within the federal judiciary’s conception of general
law, federal courts would apply general law principles rather than
the state supreme court’s otherwise definitive interpretation of
that provision.39 “[T]he federal courts gave independent and
locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate and other matters immovable and
intraterritorial in their nature and character”).
35. Id. at 18–19. Federal courts during this era took a similar approach to equity,
applying a uniform body of traditional equitable principles derived from the English Court
of Chancery to all cases that came before them, including diversity cases, rather than state
statutes or court rulings concerning equitable issues. Despite Erie’s abolition of general
law, federal courts continue—without a valid foundation—to apply this approach to
equitable remedies. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV.
217, 247–49 (2018) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1945)).
36. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19.
37. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 698–99 (2013); 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4502 (3d ed.
2019).
38. Bellia & Clark, supra note 37, at 698–99; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 75–76 (1938); see, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 373 (1893);
Collins v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428–29 (1862).
39. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development
of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (2000); see also Bellia & Clark,
supra note 37, at 699 n.187 (citing Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 F. 505, 509 (E.D.
Okla. 1923)); Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in
a Post-Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 132 (2007) (“[F]ederal courts would
sometimes refuse to follow state statutes or state constitutions, as interpreted by state
courts, if the federal court found that the state law violated more universal principles of
jurisprudence.”). “Most notoriously, in some 250 cases, the Supreme Court held that the
general common law trumped statutes agrarian states had enacted to protect local debtors
against Eastern-owned railroad creditors, provoking resentment in state courts.” David
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largely uniform readings to a variety of ostensibly state
constitutional questions including takings of property, taxing and
spending for public purposes, rate making and delegation
doctrines, and the permissible limits of governmental power.”40
In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, for example, a municipality had
issued bonds under a state law that the Iowa Supreme Court had
repeatedly held constitutional in several cases both before and
after the bonds were issued.41 The Iowa Supreme Court later
overturned those earlier cases in State ex rel. Burlington &
Missouri River R.R. Co. v. County of Wapello, holding that the
underlying law violated the state constitution and any bonds
issued under it were invalid.42
The municipality subsequently stopped paying interest on
the bonds, and the bondholders sued in diversity in federal court.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that it was generally required
to apply state courts’ interpretations of state constitutions but,
since this was an “exceptional case,” it declined to follow
Wapello.43 Importantly, the Court did not hold that Wapello was
contrary to the U.S. Constitution.44 Rather, it declared that it
would not “follow every such oscillation, from whatever cause
arising, that may possibly occur” in state courts’ interpretations of
their constitutions.45 Accordingly, it chose to follow the Iowa
Supreme Court’s earlier rulings upholding the challenged law,
because they were “sustained by reason and authority” and “in
harmony with” sixteen other states’ rulings.46 The Court
memorably concluded: “We shall never immolate truth, justice,
and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar and
decreed the sacrifice.”47
Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2007).
40. Collins, supra note 39, at 1265.
41. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 202-05 (1864).
42. Id. at 205 (citing State ex rel. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co. v. Cnty. of
Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862)).
43. Id. at 206.
44. Cf. id. at 209 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not pretended that either the statute
of Iowa, or its constitution, or the decision of its courts thereon, are in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States. . . .”); see also James B. Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311, 319 (1891).
45. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. at 205.
46. Id. at 205–06.
47. Id. at 206–07; see also Douglass v. Cnty. of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 686 (1879)
(“[W]here different constructions have been given to the same statute at different times,
we have never felt ourselves bound to follow the latest decisions, if thereby contract rights
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Professor James B. Thayer defended Gelpcke on the grounds
that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction had a special
obligation to interpret state law independently of state courts to
ensure fair treatment of other states’ citizens.48 Since Gelpcke
involved a matter of general law49 rather than federal law, it was
not binding on state courts. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court,
applying its own precedents, could continue to treat the
challenged state law as unconstitutional and refuse to enforce
bonds that a federal court, applying Gelpcke’s conception of
general law, would deem legally valid and enforceable.50
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly invoked general law in
Pine Grove v. Talcott, in which it similarly refused to follow the
Michigan Supreme Court’s rulings concerning the state
constitution because they were “not satisfactory to our minds.”51
The Pine Grove Court declared, “The question before us”—
whether a Michigan law governing bond issuances violated the
state constitution—“belongs to the domain of general
jurisprudence.”52 Mechanically following the state supreme
court’s construction of its state constitution on an issue of general
law would make a “solemn mockery” of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.53
In Erie, the Court rejected the notion of general law, holding
that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply both state
statutes and judicial rulings, regardless of whether a matter would
be deemed “local,” except when federal law requires otherwise.54
Following Erie, the Court reconceptualized its role in construing
state constitutions and statutes as trying to anticipate how the
state supreme court would resolve the matter.55 This generally,
which have accrued under earlier rulings will be injuriously affected.”); Havemeyer v. Iowa
Cnty., 70 U.S. 294, 303 (1866).
48. See Thayer, supra note 44, at 320.
49. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and
Commerce, 1836–1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 471, 494 (suggesting that Gelpcke was an extension
of general law).
50. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 (1924).
51. Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 677 (1873).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 678; see also Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. 678, 690 (1872) (holding that the
issue of whether certain state and local taxes were imposed for a “public” purpose is “not
a question of constitutional construction,” but rather a “question of general law,” and “[i]ts
solution must be sought not in the decisions of any single State tribunal, but in general
principles common to all courts”).
54. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
55. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie
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though not always, meant following the most recent state supreme
court ruling on the issue.56 Questions remained, however, about
the federal judiciary’s proper role in cases where a state’s caselaw
did not clearly reveal how the state judiciary would interpret or
apply the state constitution.
Over the years, the Court has developed a series of
abstention doctrines that prevent federal courts from resolving
doubtful state law issues. Most saliently, Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman requires federal courts to abstain from
adjudicating federal constitutional issues that may be unnecessary
to address, based on how a state court resolves an unsettled
question of state law.57 Federal courts typically engage in Pullman
abstention to give state courts an opportunity to interpret a vague
or ambiguous state legal provision in a manner that would
eliminate federal constitutional concerns.58 Litigants who initiate
state court proceedings due to Pullman abstention may reserve
their right to return to federal court, if necessary, to litigate their
federal claims.59 Although res judicata would ordinarily prohibit
claim splitting of this sort, England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners created an exception to res judicata to allow
litigants forced into state court by Pullman abstention to have
their federal claims adjudicated back in federal court, instead.60
As an alternative to complete abstention, a federal court may
instead certify state law issues to the state supreme court for
resolution, when state law authorizes that process.61 Whether a
federal court engages in abstention or certification, a litigant who
devoted time and resources to pursuing pendent state
constitutional claims is unable to have them adjudicated in its
chosen forum.62
Pullman abstention arises from the constitutional avoidance
World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1424 (2005).
56. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 292–93 (1946) (explaining that
federal courts should be able to draw upon the same range of authorities as a state supreme
court to predict whether that state supreme court would overturn one of its precedents).
57. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
58. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); see, e.g.,
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146–47 (1976).
59. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417–19 (1964).
60. Id.
61. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997); see also
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2188 (2019).
62. 15A WILLIAM MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 106.64.

3 MORLEY

2020]

12/29/2020 11:21 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

415

doctrine and Article III’s prohibition on advisory opinions.63
Potentially dispositive state law issues—such as a pendent state
constitutional claim or a question of statutory interpretation—
should be resolved prior to a federal constitutional claim, to
prevent a potentially unnecessary ruling under the U.S.
Constitution. Such concerns do not explain, however, whether the
federal or state court should resolve the state law issue.64
Pullman requires a federal court to defer to state courts
primarily to avoid the risk of reaching an erroneous state law
ruling.65 Federal courts’ incorrect predictions or conclusions about
state law “inevitably skew the decisions of persons and businesses
who rely on them and inequitably affect the losing federal litigant
who cannot appeal the decision to the state supreme court; they
may even mislead lower state courts that may be inclined to accept
federal predictions as applicable precedent.”66 Abstention is also
a matter of comity, demonstrating respect for the state judiciary’s
primary role in interpreting state law.67
In other contexts, however, such as diversity cases, the
Supreme Court has held that federal courts generally may not
abstain from adjudicating unresolved state law issues due to their
difficulty or indeterminacy.68 And many circuits have held that, in
federal question cases, concerns about erroneously resolving state
law issues do not always permit abstention, such as when the case
involves federal statutory claims rather than claims under the U.S.
Constitution,69 or cases in which the plaintiffs seek damages rather
63. See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, at 499–500 (1941).
64. Cf. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) (holding that
a federal court may resolve a case that raises both federal and state claims by adjudicating
the state law issue).
65. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 499–500.
66. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1681 (1992).
67. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415–16 (1964).
68. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943); accord Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to
Meredith, as in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
Thibodaux requires federal courts to abstain from adjudicating difficult, unresolved state
law issues that are “intimately involved with sovereign prerogative,” such as eminent
domain. Cf. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959) (holding
that federal courts may not abstain from state eminent domain cases where state law is
“clear and certain”). The Thibodaux exception is “narrow,” however, Jonathan Remy
Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1683–84, 1684 n.39 (2003), and thus seldom likely to prevent a
federal court from adjudicating state constitutional claims.
69. WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 4242; MOORE, supra note 62, § 122.21[d].
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than equitable relief.70
The Court’s approach to Pullman abstention is similarly
conflicted in federal constitutional challenges to legal provisions
that also may violate a state constitution. In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could
bring a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process challenge
to a state law without first (or also) challenging it under the state
constitution’s due process provision.71 It emphasized that
plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state court remedies before
invoking a federal court’s broad federal question jurisdiction.72
Read in isolation, Constantineau appears to hold that abstention
is appropriate only when a state court could eliminate the need to
adjudicate a federal constitutional claim by resolving some
ambiguity or vagueness in the legal provision at issue, rather than
by considering potential state constitutional challenges to it.73
Reetz v. Bozanich complicates the issue, however.74 There,
the plaintiff challenged state fishing laws and regulations under
both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as
well as a provision of the Alaska Constitution specifically relating
to fishing that lacks any federal analogue.75 The district court held
that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the lower
court should have abstained to give the state courts a chance to
consider the state constitutional challenge first.76
The upshot of Constantineau and Reetz appears to be that
federal courts must abstain from adjudicating a federal
constitutional claim only when the legal provision at issue may be
challenged under a state constitutional provision that lacks a
federal analogue and specifically applies to a particular subject
area.77 Abstention is not required when the potentially relevant
70. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996) (holding that a federal
court may dismiss or remand to state court a suit seeking equitable or discretionary relief,
but only “stay actions for damages based on abstention principles”).
71. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1971).
72. Id. at 439.
73. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.2, at 839–40 (7th ed.
2016).
74. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
75. Id. at 84 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15).
76. Id. at 87.
77. Id.; e.g., Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84–85 (1975) (holding
that the lower court should have abstained from adjudicating a federal equal protection
challenge to a redistricting statute to allow state courts to consider whether the measure
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state constitutional provision is “broad,” “sweeping,”78 and
comparable to a provision in the U.S. Constitution,79 such as an
Equal Protection80 or Due Process Clause. This rule applies
regardless of whether the plaintiff in the federal lawsuit includes
a state constitutional challenge in its complaint.81 Not all Supreme
Court precedents are entirely consistent with that dichotomy,
however.82
The Court’s unconvincing primary explanation for this
dichotomy is that some limiting principle is necessary to prevent
federal courts from abstaining too frequently in constitutional
cases.83 Since most state constitutions have general due process
and equal protection clauses, requiring abstention whenever a
litigant brings a federal due process or equal protection claim
would interfere with a wide swath of federal constitutional
litigation and amount to de facto exhaustion requirement.84
While Sutton contends that most plaintiffs are indifferent to
the grounds on which they win a case (p. 9), many public interest
violated state constitutional provisions concerning the length of officeholders’ terms);
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971) (holding that the lower court should have
abstained from adjudicating a federal equal protection challenge to changes to the state’s
system for funding public schools to allow state courts to first determine whether they
violated the state constitution); see WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 4242 (“The proper line
appears to be that abstention is in order if the case may turn on the interpretation of some
specialized state constitutional provision, but not if the state provision is substantially
similar to the federal provision that is the basis of the federal challenge.”); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 73, § 12.2, at 840.
78. Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 598 (1976) (holding that abstention was not required to allow Puerto Rican courts to
consider the validity of the challenged statute under the Puerto Rico Constitution’s antidiscrimination and equal protection provisions).
79. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984).
80. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971).
81. Compare Reetz, 397 U.S. at 87 (requiring Pullman abstention in case involving
both federal and state constitutional challenges), with Askew, 401 U.S. at 478 (requiring
Pullman abstention where plaintiff brought only a federal constitutional challenge).
82. See, e.g., City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 641 (1959)
(holding, in a case involving claims under both the federal and state constitutions’
Contracts Clauses, that when a state court’s “evaluation of [a state law’s] validity under
the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal
Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision
unnecessarily”).
83. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 598 (declining to require abstention so that Puerto
Rico’s courts could determine whether the challenged statute violated “broad and
sweeping” provisions in Puerto Rico’s Constitution to avoid “convert[ing] abstention from
an exception into a general rule”).
84. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1426–27 (1999).
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organizations that bring constitutional challenges would often
prefer to generate favorable precedents in federal courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court under the federal Constitution,
because they would be much more widely applicable than a state
supreme court’s ruling.85 Indeed, a federal court’s ruling on a
matter of state constitutional law, while a potentially persuasive
precedent, would not even be binding on state courts.86
Despite Sutton’s disappointment that litigants have generally
avoided pursuing state constitutional claims in federal court
(p. 8), he embraces abstention and certification of state
constitutional questions to state courts (p. 197). He explains that
abstention ensures that federal courts do not “intrud[e] on
sensitive and complicated issues of state law without giving the
state courts a chance to review, and perhaps resolve, the matter
first” (p. 197). He also promotes certification as an alternative
that “state courts should welcome” (p. 198).
This Review is not the appropriate venue for a
comprehensive theory of federal court review of state law claims,
but four initial observations are in order. First, most basically, if
the Supreme Court were to agree with Sutton that litigants should
assert state constitutional claims in federal court more frequently,
it must revisit Pullman abstention and other related doctrines,
such as certification, that may deter or hinder them from doing so.
Under the Court’s current approach, a plaintiff who challenges a
state or local legal provision under both the federal and state
constitutions increases the risk of having its federal claim delayed.
Although a federal court may abstain regardless of whether a
plaintiff actually asserts a state constitutional claim,87 framing a
strong claim under the state constitution and affirmatively
bringing it to the court’s attention underscores its importance.
Whether the federal court abstains in favor of separate state
litigation or instead certifies the state law question to the state
supreme court, the plaintiff must participate in an entirely new set
of proceedings.88 Moreover, the state court may be less hospitable
85. Public interest groups’ desire to secure the broadest possible impact for favorable
judicial rulings has contributed to controversies over the validity of nationwide injunctions.
See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2019).
86. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); see also Amanda Frost, Inferiority
Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of
Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 76 (2015).
87. See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971).
88. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
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to the plaintiff’s claims, and its findings or reasoning may
negatively influence the federal court if the case returns there.
Second, in any event, the Supreme Court should revisit the
Constantineau-Reetz dichotomy. State supreme courts have the
prerogative to construe their constitutions differently from the
federal Constitution, even when both documents’ language is
identical.89 Accordingly, a state court’s opportunity to interpret or
apply its constitution generally should not depend on whether a
parallel provision happens to exist in the U.S. Constitution, or the
provision can be characterized as broad or narrow.90 The federal
judiciary’s interests in both avoiding legally inaccurate
conclusions and minimizing friction with state courts is the same
regardless of how broadly or narrowly a state constitutional
provision is drafted. Thus, at a minimum, the Supreme Court
should adopt a standard for Pullman abstention that applies
consistently across all types of state constitutional provisions—
regardless of whether that standard ultimately entrusts the task of
resolving state constitutional issues in federal cases to federal
courts, state courts, or some combination of the two.91
Third, when a plaintiff brings a federal constitutional
challenge to a state or local legal provision, the federal court
should not consider abstaining on the grounds that the provision
may be subject to challenge under the state constitution unless the
(“While certification may engender less delay and create fewer additional expenses for
litigants than would abstention, it entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary
decision of the state question on the merits by the federal court.”); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 293–94 (1968).
89. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Brennan, supra
note 3, at 489; cf. Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 457, 486–90 (2018)
(demonstrating how various jurisdictions may adapt different interpretations of the same
legal standard).
90. Concerns about state constitutional provisions that are part of a detailed,
integrated regulatory scheme may instead be addressed in the context of abstention under
Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) (requiring federal courts to abstain from
adjudicating difficult state law issues when states have created complex regulatory schemes
implemented by administrative agencies); see, e.g., Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. So. Ry. Co.,
341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (defining the “Burford doctrine”).
91. Part IV of this Review suggests that the standard governing Pullman abstention
in constitutional cases involving unsettled issues of state law should also apply to a district
court’s decision about whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction in a federal question
case over a pendent state law claim that raises a novel state law issue, see 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).
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plaintiff has included a state constitutional claim in the
complaint.92 The plaintiff is master of its complaint and may
determine the causes of action it wishes to pursue93 and, through
its choice of claims or parties,94 the forum that will adjudicate the
matter.95 A federal court should not compel a plaintiff to pursue a
different cause of action in a different court as a condition of
having its federal constitutional claim adjudicated. Under current
law, a federal court will generally not decline to adjudicate a
federal constitutional claim on the grounds that the plaintiffs
could have brought a federal statutory challenge instead.
Potential causes of action under state constitutions should not
pose greater obstacles to the adjudication of federal constitutional
claims.
Pullman abstention is appropriate where an antecedent state
law question, such as the proper meaning of a state law, poses an
obstacle to the accurate resolution of a federal constitutional
claim. But the fact that a state or local legal provision may be
invalid on state constitutional grounds should not preclude a
plaintiff from pursuing their federal constitutional claims. Such an
approach impermissibly turns abstention into an exhaustion
requirement.96
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when federal courts
adjudicate state constitutional claims, they should not preclude or
seriously impede the state judiciary from reconsidering the issue
in subsequent cases. Thus, a federal court should not certify a
statewide plaintiff class of all rightholders throughout the state in
cases involving a state constitutional challenge to a legal
provision.97 Similarly, federal courts should generally decline to
92. Cf. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (“The fact that
there may be buried in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself
enough to invoke this rule [of avoiding constitutional questions].”).
93. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1987).
94. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005), quoting MOORE, supra
note 62, § 107.14[2][c], at 107–67.
95. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398–99; Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 39
(1909) (“The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice
cannot be properly denied.”).
96. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971). Additionally, Pullman
abstention is categorically unnecessary based on a state constitutional provision when the
state supreme court has adopted a strict, exceptionless “lockstep” interpretation of the
provision at issue. In such cases, since the meaning of the state constitution tracks the
federal constitution, there is no need for the federal court to delay in adjudicating the
federal constitutional issue—even if the state courts have never addressed it.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
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enforce a state constitution by entering a statewide defendantoriented injunction completely prohibiting enforcement of a legal
provision against anyone, anywhere in the state.98 Statewide
classes and defendant-oriented injunctions impact rightholders
throughout the state, typically precluding or mooting subsequent
relitigation, including in state courts. If a federal court believes
these types of measures would be appropriate or necessary, it
should either abstain or, as discussed in Part IV, decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional
claim.99
Though these proposed reforms do not purport to address
the central question of the federal judiciary’s role in adjudicating
either state law issues in general, or state constitutional issues in
particular, they would eliminate arbitrary distinctions in current
doctrine, minimize unnecessary abstentions, and ensure that
federal courts do not completely displace the state judiciary in
resolving state constitutional questions.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The Eleventh Amendment is another major obstacle to
litigating state constitutional claims in federal court. On its face,
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits in federal court against
a state by citizens of other states.100 The Supreme Court has held
that the underlying sovereign immunity principle the amendment
codifies also protects a state from lawsuits by its own citizens.101
Sovereign immunity extends not only to lawsuits against the state
itself, but also state agencies102 and state officers acting in their
official capacity.103
Ex parte Young created an exception to state sovereign

98. See Morley, supra note 85, at 28 (defining “defendant-oriented injunctions”); see
also id. at 25–27 (discussing the risk of overbroad associational injunctions completely
prohibiting enforcement of a legal provision against anyone within a jurisdiction).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2018) (allowing district courts to decline supplemental
jurisdiction in “exceptional circumstances,” for “compelling reasons”).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
101. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1890). These prohibitions extend to lawsuits
in both state and federal court. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019)
(holding that a state is immune from private suits in other states’ courts); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (same for a state’s own courts).
102. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781 (1978) (per curiam).
103. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–67 (1985).
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immunity, holding that the Eleventh Amendment generally does
not prohibit suits against state officers for injunctive relief against
violations of the U.S. Constitution.104 The Court reasoned that
state officers who violate the U.S. Constitution act without official
authority, since a state cannot authorize constitutional
violations.105 In such cases, the officer is “stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct.”106 The suit “does not
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”107
The Court refused to extend this approach to state officials’
alleged violations of state constitutions, however. In Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment protects states, state agencies, and
state officers from being sued in federal court for violations of
state law, including a state constitution.108 Even when a plaintiff
brings a federal constitutional challenge under Ex parte Young,
sovereign immunity still applies to any pendent claims under the
state constitution.109 Pennhurst explained that the Young
exception arises from the special “need to promote the
vindication of federal rights,” which is categorically inapplicable
to a state constitutional claim.110 Furthermore, instructing “state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law” is a much
greater “intrusion on state sovereignty” than enforcing the U.S.
Constitution.111
Pennhurst does not completely preclude federal courts from
adjudicating state constitutional claims; for example, they may
still hear suits against counties, municipalities, and their officials,
who are all unable to invoke sovereign immunity.112 Nevertheless,
the ruling impairs plaintiffs’ ability to litigate state constitutional
claims in federal court, since certain claims may be brought only
against state agencies or officials. If rightholders suing such
defendants wish to preserve their right to a federal forum, they
104. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). To fall within the Young exception,
the injunctive relief must be prospective, rather than retrospective, in nature. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
105. Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 159.
108. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 105–06.
111. Id. at 106.
112. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
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must pursue their federal constitutional claims in federal court
and state constitutional claims separately in state court. This
approach involves substantial expense, inconvenience, and
duplicative use of judicial resources. Perhaps more importantly,
unlike with Pullman abstention, whichever case concludes first
will give rise to res judicata, preventing the other proceeding from
concluding.113 Alternatively, litigants may forego federal court by
bringing both their federal and state constitutional challenges in
state court, subject to the possibility of Supreme Court review.
Scholars have thoroughly debated whether Pennhurst
accurately interprets the Eleventh Amendment.114 Putting aside
such larger-scale critiques, the Court could somewhat mitigate the
obstacle that the Pennhurst Doctrine poses to the litigation of
state constitutional claims through a simple procedural device:
allowing plaintiffs to assert England reservations in state court
cases brought due to the Pennhurst Doctrine. As noted earlier,
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners provides
that a plaintiff that is forced to litigate state law issues or claims in
state court because a federal court has engaged in Pullman
abstention may “reserve” the right to return to federal court to
litigate its federal claims, if necessary.115 England is an exception
to the res judicata principle that the state court’s judgment
concerning state law claims or issues typically precludes
subsequent litigation in federal court of federal constitutional
claims arising from the same operative facts.116
The Supreme Court has implied that England reservations
apply only in cases involving Pullman abstention117 and repeatedly
113. Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh
Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 658–59 (1985).
114. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 52–62 (1988) (arguing that, although Pennhurst
was based on a more historically accurate view of state sovereign immunity than Young,
the Court’s conclusion was erroneous); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 84–85 (1984) (arguing that
Pennhurst is based on a historically inaccurate view of sovereign immunity).
115. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
116. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84–85 (1984); see
also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980). Federal law requires federal courts to apply
state law to determine the res judicata effect of a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2018); Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
117. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 n.7 (holding that, when “federal and state-law claims
are sufficiently intertwined,” a “plaintiff can preserve his right to a federal forum for his
federal claims” if the “federal court abstains from passing on the federal claims to first
allow the state court to address the state-law issues”). Some lower courts, however, have
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declined to expand exceptions to res judicata principles.118 Some
commentators have likewise concluded that federal courts must
afford full res judicata effect to state court judgments issued in the
Pennhurst context119 and decline to recognize England
reservations.120 England’s reasoning, however, squarely supports
recognizing an exception to res judicata when Pennhurst
precludes plaintiffs from pursuing state constitutional claims
against state officers in federal court.121
England held that a “litigant who has properly invoked the
jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal
constitutional claims” should not be compelled, “without his
consent and through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state
court’s determination of those claims.”122 A state court’s role in
interpreting state law cannot limit the federal judiciary’s
“primacy . . . in deciding questions of federal law.”123 A plaintiff’s
nevertheless enforced England reservations to allow plaintiffs who litigated state
constitutional claims in state court due to the Pennhurst Doctrine to later turn to federal
court to litigate federal constitutional issues. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of
Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1211, 1268 & n.178 (2004) (citing cases).
118. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 84–85 (declining to recognize an exception to res judicata
for § 1983 claims); Fed. Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (declining to
recognize an exception to res judicata because the doctrine “serves vital public interests
beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case”);
see also Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917) (holding that res
judicata “is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical
time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public policy and of
private peace, which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts” (quotation
marks omitted)).
119. See, e.g., James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims
Against State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and
Flores, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 750–51 (1999); Robert H. Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman:
The Eleventh Amendment, Erie, and Pendant State Law Claims, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 277
(1985). But see David Shapiro, The Supreme Court, Comment, 1983 Term: Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 81 (1984).
120. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19
GA. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1985) (“[T]he reservation procedure approved in England v.
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners now appears to be unavailable outside the
narrow ‘abstention’ context of the England case itself. That seems to be so even though [a]
plaintiff’s post-Pennhurst litigation can scarcely be said to be voluntarily in state court.”);
see also Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the
Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 80 (1982); Leanne B. De Vos, Comment,
Claim Preclusion and Section 1983 Civil Rights Actions: Migra v. Warren City School
District Board of Education, 70 IOWA L. REV. 287, 303 (1984).
121. See, e.g., Del. Valley Transplant Prog. v. Coye, 722 F. Supp. 1188, 1198–99 (D.N.J.
1989); cf. Friedman, supra note 117, at 1268–69.
122. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
123. Id. at 415–16.
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ability to seek a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court
from a state court’s ruling on a federal issue is no substitute for
the right to litigate that federal claim in federal court in the first
instance.124
Although England concerned the right to return to federal
court after litigating state law issues in state court as a result of
Pullman abstention, this reasoning is equally applicable in the
context of the Pennhurst Doctrine. Both Pullman abstention and
the Pennhurst Doctrine are constitutionally rooted, judicially
created principles that require litigation of certain state law claims
in state court to protect state sovereignty. Applying res judicata
in either context would impede plaintiffs’ access to a federal
forum for the adjudication of their federal rights.
On the other hand, a major difference between Pullman
abstention and the Pennhurst Doctrine is that the former can be
completely unavoidable, whereas a plaintiff may always avoid the
latter by foregoing its state law claims. Pullman abstention applies
whenever resolution of an unsettled issue of state law—including
a state constitutional issue—could alleviate the need for a federal
court to reach a federal constitutional ruling.125 Accordingly, a
federal court may engage in Pullman abstention and require a
plaintiff to litigate a state law issue in state court even when a
complaint raises only federal claims.126 In such cases, there is no
way for a plaintiff with federal claims to retain its right to a federal
forum without an exception to res judicata principles.
With the Pennhurst Doctrine, in contrast, a plaintiff may
guarantee its right to litigate its federal constitutional claims
against state officials in a federal forum simply by foregoing any
pendent claims under the state constitution. State sovereign
immunity poses no obstacle to pursuing federal constitutional
claims against state officials in federal court;127 Pennhurst’s
restrictions are triggered only by a plaintiff’s choice to also pursue
state law claims for which the state enjoys sovereign immunity. If
federal courts wish to follow Sutton’s advice and promote state
constitutions as vibrant, independent sources of rights, however,
they should not force plaintiffs to forego state constitutional
claims as a condition for litigating their federal constitutional
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 416–17.
See supra notes 57–58, 63 and accompanying text.
See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971).
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).
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rights in federal court. Assuming the Supreme Court intends to
retain its current conception of state sovereign immunity,
including the Pennhurst Doctrine, it should enforce England
reservations in that context. In other words, when the Pennhurst
Doctrine requires a plaintiff to litigate state constitutional claims
against state officials in state court, res judicata should not
preclude that plaintiff from subsequently litigating its related
federal constitutional claims against those defendants in federal
court.
IV. DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
OVER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
When neither abstention requirements nor the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits a federal court from adjudicating state
constitutional claims, it usually may still decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims in federal question
cases. District courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
state constitutional claims per se. They may exercise diversity
jurisdiction over such claims, in the rare circumstances they arise
in litigation between citizens of different states.128 Most
opportunities to adjudicate state constitutional claims, however,
arise in federal question cases. Plaintiffs pursuing federal causes
of action may invoke the court’s supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367 to assert state law claims arising from the same
“core nucleus of operative fact” as their federal claims.129 In City
of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a local
ordinance under parallel provisions of the federal and Texas
constitutions.130
Unlike most other grants of subject-matter jurisdiction,131
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018); see Roger F. Williams, Foreword: Continued
Commitment to State Constitutional Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 317, 318 (2004); see also
Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 60 & n.295
(2007).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2018); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
130. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 291 (1982). The Supreme
Court remanded the case so the Fifth Circuit could clarify whether its ruling on the state
constitutional claim constituted independent and adequate state law grounds for its
judgment. Id. at 295.
131. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (discussing the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them”).
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however, supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary.132 In a federal
question case, § 1367(c)(1) allows a district court to decline
jurisdiction over a state law claim that raises “a novel or complex
issue of State law.”133 A separate provision allows the court to
similarly refuse jurisdiction over pendent claims, including state
constitutional claims, when all of the federal claims in the suit
have been dismissed.134 The Supreme Court has directed lower
courts to exercise this discretion “in the manner that best serves
the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”135
Whereas Pullman abstention applies only when a plaintiff has
brought a federal constitutional challenge,136 district courts may
decline supplemental jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the
underlying federal causes of action.
District courts frequently refuse to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state constitutional challenges to state and local
legal provisions,137 particularly where the state supreme court
does not construe its state constitution in lockstep with the U.S.
Constitution138 or the relevant provisions of the two charters
materially differ from each other.139 Federal courts explain that
such dismissals demonstrate “respect for the right of a state court
system to construe that state’s own constitution.”140 This
132. See City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).
134. Id. § 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Watson v. City of Allen, 821 F.3d 624, 642 (5th Cir.
2016).
135. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172–73 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).
136. See supra notes 57–58, 63 and accompanying text.
137. E.g., Peterson v. Miami Corr. Facility, No. 3:07-CV-397, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34565, at *17 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2008); Mulgrew v. Fumo, No. 03-CV-5039, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14654, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2004); Lansing Mercy Ambulance Serv. v. Tri-Cnty.
Emergency Med. Cont. Auth., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1337, 1348 (W.D. Mich. 1995); see also
Patel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:13-CV-09358-SVW-AS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196990,
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014); Akrawi v. Remillet, No. 10-13234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115134, at *38 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2011); Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05-CV638 (DAK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55024, at *10 (D. Utah June 2, 2010).
138. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s free exercise and establishment clause claims under the Utah Constitution,
because the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of those provisions does “not follow
federal constitutional models” and “appears to be undergoing an evolution”), aff’d in
relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
139. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 483, 487 (3d
Cir. 1998).
140. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Collins v. Daniels,
No. 1:17-CV-00776-RJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225034, at *67 (D.N.M. Dec. 11, 2017);
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consistent reluctance to adjudicate state constitutional claims is
another contributing factor that deters plaintiffs from devoting
time and resources to attempting to litigate them in federal court.
Sutton’s concern about the lack of state constitutional claims
in federal court (p. 8) suggests that lower courts should reconsider
their consistent reluctance to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over them. In the post-Erie world, state courts are the final
expositors of state law, including state constitutional law. When a
federal court adjudicates a state constitutional issue, it is primarily
performing a dispute resolution, rather than law exposition,
function141—particularly since its interpretation of the state
constitution is not binding on state courts. Viewed from that
perspective, allowing federal courts to resolve state constitutional
issues expedites resolution of cases and reduces litigants’ costs by
eliminating the need for parallel state court litigation.
Moreover, Professor Robert Schapiro argues that federal
courts’ adjudication of state constitutional issues facilitates crosspollination of ideas and can provide greater protection than
elected state judges for members of politically unpopular
groups.142 Input from federal courts may improve the quality of
state courts’ constitutional interpretation by promoting a dialogue
between the courts. As an alternate forum for construing state
constitutional provisions—albeit not definitively—federal courts
can also act as a check, deterring state courts from underenforcing
state constitutional norms.143
On the other hand, federal courts’ adjudication of state
constitutional claims can hinder the ability of state courts to
develop their own body of state constitutional law distinct from
federal constitutional law. Every state constitutional issue that a
federal court adjudicates is a missed opportunity for state courts
to articulate state constitutional norms for themselves. And as a
body of federal precedent concerning the meaning of state
constitutional provisions develops, it may exert a gravitational
force on state courts’ reasoning, even though it is not formally
binding.144 As noted earlier, federal courts also risk reaching
Smith v. Carrasco, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
141. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 494 (1994).
142. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1441–48.
143. Id. at 1450–51.
144. Cf. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
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erroneous conclusions about state constitutional provisions
without the opportunity for correction by the state supreme court.
Thus, § 1367(c)(1) raises many of the same questions
concerning the proper role of federal courts in construing state
law as the Pullman abstention doctrine.145 Rather than treating
these as distinct issues, the Court should apply a single, consistent
standard to both. Pullman abstention occurs when an unsettled
issue of state law arises in a case involving a claim under the U.S.
Constitution.146 Section 1367(c)(1) applies when a novel issue of
state law arises in a federal question case.147 The former may
therefore be seen as simply a special case of the latter. Instead of
construing § 1367(c)(1) as an independent, broad grant of
discretion to district courts,148 it should be read as codifying
the same standard for declining supplemental jurisdiction as
Pullman establishes for abstention—however the Court chooses
to define it.
V. CONCLUSION
51 Imperfect Solutions demonstrates the various ways in
which federal and state constitutional law interact. Sometimes,
state courts construe state constitutions to protect individual
rights to a greater extent than the U.S. Constitution. In other
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the
federal Constitution induces state courts to adopt similarly limited
constructions of analogous provisions within their own
constitutions. And in still others, state supreme courts’
interpretations of their respective charters influence the U.S.
Supreme Court to broaden its approach to the U.S. Constitution.
While Sutton emphasizes the important role that state courts
703, 725–26 (2016).
145. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary: The 1990 Adoption of § 1367,
Codifying “Supplemental” Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, at 834–35 (West 1993);
Deborah J. Challener & John B. Howell, III, Remand and Appellate Review When a
District Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 81
TEMP. L. REV. 1067, 1099 n.195 (2008); cf. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1421 n.52 (“Section
1367’s codification of novelty and complexity presents some tension with the doctrine of
Pullman abstention.”); Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow
Directions: When District Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 995, 1021 (1998) (arguing that
§ 1367(c)(1) does not codify Pullman abstention).
146. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).
148. Cf. City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
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play in construing state constitutions, the book leaves unanswered
questions about the role of federal judges. Current Supreme Court
doctrine is riddled with inconsistencies. A federal court’s ability to
resolve unsettled issues of state law differs depending on whether a
case arises under its federal question or diversity jurisdiction.149 For
state constitutional claims, a federal court’s power depends on
whether the provision at issue has an analogue in the federal
constitution.150 The Court should synthesize its precedents in this area
and articulate a coherent theory—a theory rooted in considerations
of federalism, comity, judicial economy, and concern for the adequate
and accurate enforcement of litigants’ underlying substantive rights—
about federal judges’ responsibility, if any, for addressing unsettled
state law issues.
Scholars such as Professor Robert Schapiro urge a broad role,
emphasizing the value of inter-court dialogue.151 Others, such as
Judge Dolores Sloviter of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
are more concerned about federal judges’ limited ability to correctly
anticipate how state supreme courts will resolve unsettled state law
issues.152 As a first step, this Review suggests initial procedural
reforms to reduce friction between federal and state courts and
promote consistency and predictability in the litigation of state
constitutional issues. 51 Imperfect Solutions helpfully spotlights state
constitutions as an important substantive source of rights, but we
must give equal consideration to the challenging procedural issues
they raise under “Our Federalism.”153

149. Compare Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (requiring federal courts to abstain from
adjudicating unsettled issues of state law in cases involving a claim under the U.S.
Constitution), with Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) (generally
prohibiting federal courts from abstaining from adjudicating unsettled issues of state law
in diversity cases).
150. Compare Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (requiring federal courts to
abstain from adjudicating federal constitutional claims to allow state courts to first address
potential claims under narrow, unique provisions of state constitutions), with Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1971) (prohibiting federal courts from abstaining
from adjudicating federal constitutional claims to allow state courts to first address
potential claims under analogous state constitutional provision).
151. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1441–48.
152. Sloviter, supra note 66, at 1681.
153. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

